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medium February 3, 2026

The Chrysalis Backdoor: Vulnerable Notepad++ Updater Abuse by a Chinese APT Campaign

Source report →

Rapid7 Labs uncovered a sophisticated espionage campaign featuring a new custom backdoor dubbed "Chrysalis" that was delivered through compromised Notepad++ distribution infrastructure. The attack chain begins with an NSIS installer that deploys multiple components including a renamed legitimate Bitdefender executable used for DLL sideloading, which then loads and executes encrypted shellcode. The malware employs multiple layers of obfuscation including custom decryption routines, API hashing techniques, and string obfuscation to evade detection. Chrysalis establishes persistence through Windows services or registry modifications and communicates with command-and-control servers using encrypted channels that mimic legitimate API traffic patterns.

The backdoor provides comprehensive remote access capabilities including interactive shell execution, file system operations, process creation, and data exfiltration. Additional artifacts discovered during the investigation revealed the use of a Tiny-C-Compiler to execute Metasploit shellcode that downloads Cobalt Strike beacons, demonstrating a multi-tool approach. One particularly notable loader variant utilizes Microsoft's undocumented Warbird code protection framework through the NtQuerySystemInformation system call to execute shellcode within the memory space of legitimate Microsoft-signed binaries. The campaign also includes various loader variants that deploy Cobalt Strike beacons with consistent infrastructure patterns and shared cryptographic keys, indicating coordinated operations across multiple attack vectors.

URL 13
https://api.skycloudcenter.com/a/chat/s/70521ddf-a2ef-4adf-9cf0-6d8e24aaa821
http://api.wiresguard.com/users/admin
http://api.wiresguard.com/update/v1
http://api.wiresguard.com/api/FileUpload/submit
http://59.110.7.32:8880/uffhxpSy
http://59.110.7.32:8880/api/getBasicInfo/v1
http://59.110.7.32:8880/api/Metadata/submit
http://124.222.137.114:9999/3yZR31VK
http://124.222.137.114:9999/api/updateStatus/v1
http://124.222.137.114:9999/api/Info/submit
https://api.wiresguard.com/users/system
https://api.wiresguard.com/api/getInfo/v1
https://api.wiresguard.com/api/Info/submit
DOMAIN 2
api.skycloudcenter.com
api.wiresguard.com
IP ADDRESS 4
95.179.213.0
61.4.102.97
59.110.7.32
124.222.137.114
SHA256 FILE HASH 16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Detections

Additional detection ideas (9)
  • Detect executables masquerading as legitimate system files in non-standard directories
  • Detect broad file system enumeration or searching across SharePoint, code repos, and internal wikis
  • Flag processes decoding or deobfuscating data using certutil, base64, or XOR operations
  • Detect reflective DLL injection or in-memory assembly loading without disk writes
  • Monitor cmd.exe for obfuscated commands or unusual parent-child process chains
  • Alert on deletion of log files, scripts, or artifacts immediately after execution
  • Detect file downloads via certutil, bitsadmin, curl, or PowerShell from external URLs
  • Detect tampered release artifacts, force-pushed tags, or unauthorized package publications in CI/CD
  • Monitor for C2 communication over HTTP/HTTPS to uncommon or newly registered domains