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high September 17, 2025

Driver of Destruction: How a Legitimate Driver Is Being Used To Take Down AV Processes

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A new AV‑killer malware, active since at least October 2024, exploits a legitimate, digitally‑signed driver originally known as ThrottleStop.sys, now renamed ThrottleBlood.sys, using a technique called BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) to bypass system defenses. The driver exposes unprotected IOCTLs that allow arbitrary physical memory access via MmMapIoSpace, enabling attackers with admin rights to escalate into kernel-level read/write. When loaded, the AV‑killer binary (All.exe) leverages this flaw to inject shellcode that invokes kernel functions such as PsTerminateProcess, directly terminating AV/EDR processes. Targeted products include Microsoft Defender, Kaspersky, Avast, McAfee, CrowdStrike, ESET, Sophos, Symantec, and others, with process names hardcoded for rapid enumeration and kill attempts. By operating in kernel space, the malware bypasses common self-protection and user-mode monitoring, giving adversaries an efficient method to neutralize endpoint defenses.

In the investigated campaign, threat actors obtained initial access via valid RDP credentials on an SMTP server, then escalated privileges using Mimikatz and pass‑the‑hash lateral movement techniques. The threat actors then deployed both the vulnerable driver and All.exe, to disable security software before executing MedusaLocker ransomware. While some AV platforms, such as Kaspersky Endpoint Security withstood termination attempts due to strong self-defense features, most organizations suffered large-scale endpoint encryption after AV/EDR shutdown. The vulnerability that enabled the AV bypass, CVE‑2025‑7771, has since been reported, and the vendor is working on a patch.

SHA1 FILE HASH 9
82ED942A52CDCF120A8919730E00BA37619661A3
F02DAF614109F39BABDCB6F8841DD6981E929D70
C0979EC20B87084317D1BFA50405F7149C3B5C5F
EFF7919D5DE737D9A64F7528E86E3666051A49AA
0A15BE464A603B1EEBC61744DC60510CE169E135
D5A050C73346F01FC9AD767D345ED36C221BAAC2
987834891CEA821BCD3CE1F6D3E549282D38B8D3
86A2A93A31E0151888C52DBBC8E33A7A3F4357DB
DCAED7526CDA644A23DA542D01017D48D97C9533
Library detections (2)
  • Driver Loaded from Unusual Path
  • PowerShell Invoke WmiExec or Invoke SMBExec Usage
Additional detection ideas (4)
  • Monitor for tampering with security tools — service stops, driver unloads, or config changes
  • Detect logins from valid accounts originating from unusual locations, devices, or at abnormal times
  • Alert on credential dumping via LSASS access, SAM registry reads, or DCSync
  • Detect mass file encryption patterns — high-frequency file writes with entropy changes