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high May 5, 2026

ClickFix Campaign Delivers SectopRAT via EtherHiding & BYOI Python

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Vega Threat Research uncovered a large-scale ClearFake / ClickFix campaign compromising over 2,000 WordPress sites. The operation uses a multi-stage infection chain and appears to function as a multi-tenant traffic distribution system, where initial access and victim filtering are handled upstream, and final payload delivery is controlled by downstream actors. Notably, the campaign leverages “EtherHiding”-style techniques, retrieving parts of its delivery logic from blockchain-based infrastructure to make takedown and analysis more difficult.

The attack begins in the browser with injected scripts that profile the victim’s environment and selectively deliver a fake verification prompt to targeted users. This often takes the form of a spoofed reCAPTCHA challenge, adding legitimacy to the lure and increasing the likelihood of user interaction. Victims are then tricked into executing a command on their own system, effectively bypassing traditional browser-based protections.

Once executed, the infection chain leverages trusted, signed binaries to run malicious scripts under legitimate-looking processes. These scripts download and execute additional payloads while evading common security controls and establishing persistence on the system.

In its final stage, the campaign deploys Python-based malware components, including a full-featured information stealer and a secondary lightweight implant. The malware operates largely in memory and uses legitimate infrastructure to blend in with normal activity.

The stealer targets a wide range of sensitive data, including browser-stored credentials, session cookies, financial information, cryptocurrency wallets, messaging apps, and various desktop applications. It also supports surveillance capabilities and system reconnaissance, enabling continued access and further exploitation.

IP ADDRESS 6
212.34.138.4
138.124.66.23
194.150.220.218
45.155.69.224
45.155.69.48
193.33.195.32
DOMAIN 10
fw96.data-api-cloud-program.in.net
bagginess78.cloud-api-system-control.in.net
algorithm.in.net
frost-tree-nord.base-blockchain-ground-false.in.net
woosh-duck.agri-clock-core-sn.in.net
carlessclapped.com
download2392.mediafire.com
download2390.mediafire.com
bsc-testnet.drpc.org
data-seed-prebsc-1-s1.bnbchain.org
SHA256 FILE HASH 4
36b7f4fef5e984a5d60352ef7661ba0bf809feebd749ba1d5ab8d90bdf7feda0
556fdc9932afc5f176803ae67dbc3b9e54c611f1b720e1140ec540e2d151396a
4bfdb2a8f9f3cf83c656c7f25352d46c46a58f5b685a407cf7210aecdc1464f7
9287520644ae33bd6655555fff86b4f026c7f3d1d838ead02b676172450bbb27
FILE NAME 5
AcPowerNotification.exe
SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs
mnvqlprtyntv
ktkhzktujk
wslservice.exe

Detections (10)

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  • Execution of WScript App-V Publishing script to proxy execution of PowerShell
  • PowerShell Obfuscation Methods
  • SyncAppvPublishingServer VBS Execute Arbitrary PowerShell Code
  • Detect extraction of web session cookies from browser processes or profile directories
  • Alert on processes accessing browser credential stores, cookies, or session databases
  • Detect encoded PowerShell, download cradles, and AMSI bypasses
  • Detect executables masquerading as legitimate system files in non-standard directories
  • Detect processes reading credential files, env vars, or config stores
  • Detect clipboard-to-terminal paste operations containing encoded or obfuscated commands
  • Detect malware resolving C2 addresses from public web services (pastebins, calendars, DNS TXT)